Thursday, February 28, 2013

Spain's banking system bleeding contained for now

Spain's banking system continues to struggle, with Bankia reporting more losses and tapping the government's bailout vehicle.
The Guardian: - Spain's answer to RBS – Bankia – published the worst results ever seen by a Spanish corporation, racking up 2012 losses of €19.2 bn (£16.6bn) as the nationalised bank drowned in a sea of toxic real estate left over from the country's burst housing bubble.

The figures confirmed the dire fortunes of a bank formed out of a merger of seven of Spain's ailing savings banks in 2010 as the government made a futile attempt to save them from disaster. Client flight during 2012 helped bring a 13% fall in total deposits.

Bankia became the focus of Spain's banking crisis last year after auditors refused to sign off on the accounts presented by company president Rodrigo Rato, a former finance minister from prime minister Mariano Rajoy's People's party (PP) and one-time head of the International Monetary Fund. It is now taking €18bn in bailout funds from the country's Frob bank restructuring fund, which had to borrow the money from the eurozone's bailout fund as part of a €40bn rescue of several struggling banks.
2012 has been particularly difficult for Spanish banks who relied on domestic deposits. Panicked depositors moved cash to Germany or even out of the Eurozone altogether to Switzerland. That forced the banks to tap the ECB's long and short-term lending programs for most of their funding needs.

But there may be some good news on the horizon. Some deposits are returning to Spain - cash flows recently turned positive. The flow data has a great deal of noise due to the effects of recent tax deposits as well as the issuance of commercial paper (pagares). The adjustment for pagares is shown below.

Source: Credit Suisse

Whatever the case, the "run on banks" taking place in Spain a year ago seems to have stopped - for now. That in turn slightly reduced banks' reliance on the ECB, particularly in the short-term funding program (MRO).



And as discussed before (see post), this reversal of flows should reduce Spain's TARGET2 liability - which is exactly what happened.


Clearly, both of these measures are highly elevated relative to historical levels, but nevertheless the "bleeding" has been contained.


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Wednesday, February 27, 2013

French consumer recession is likely driven by job losses

Recent retail numbers from France are showing an ongoing consumer recession in spite of signs of improvement in confidence elsewhere in the EU. In fact the EU economic sentiment numbers today beat expectations to the upside -  nothing to write home about, but there are signs of stabilization (for now). French Retail PMI on the other hand shows highly stressed consumers generating the sharpest fall in retail sales in six months. French retail PMI materially dragged down the Eurozone's overall PMI.
Markit: - The French retail sector was caught in a deepening downturn during February. Sales fell sharply on both a monthly and annual basis, while there was a survey-record shortfall versus previously set plans. Retailers’ gross margins continued to be squeezed by a combination of higher purchasing costs and strong competitive pressures.
France Retail PMI® (source: Markit)

Job losses in France are likely the culprit, as French jobless claims hit a 15-year high last month.
Reuters: - The number of people out of work in France shot up again in January after a smaller rise in December, piling new pressure on Socialist President Francois Hollande who has made tackling joblessness his top priority.

The number of jobseekers in mainland France jumped by 43,900 or 1.4 percent, signalling a return to the rapid pace of increase seen over 19 straight months to December - although half of the rise was due to a change in methodology in January.
Source: Deutsche Bank

Until job losses are under control, it is hard to imagine consumer sentiment and spending improving. And as we've seen in the US, the time period from job market improvements to pickup in consumer spending can be fairly long.


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Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Draining excess reserves and the exit strategy

Questions continue to surround the Fed’s eventual exit from years of quantitative easing. The ultimate fate of what is to become of the 3.5 - 4 trillion dollar portfolio of securities (the expected peak holdings of Fed’s balance sheet) will determine, among other things, long-term interest rates, mortgage rates, corporate and US government borrowing costs, profitability of the banking system, returns on pension and insurance portfolios, and even the value of the dollar. In short, the exit strategy will drive the fixed income markets for years to come.

Some argue that the Fed has no need to sell securities and can simply sit on the portfolio as it winds down naturally through maturities and prepayments. The Fed can keep the economy from overheating by simply raising rates on excess reserves. And the fact that bank reserves (deposits at the Fed) will be in the trillions for years to come shouldn't matter they argue. That's because these reserves do not result in excessive lending and therefore are not inflationary. The lack of transmission from excess reserves to lending is visible in the so-called money multiplier (discussed here), which is at historical lows.

In normal times this argument may hold, but these are by no means normal times. By purchasing unprecedented amounts of securities, the Fed “created” trillions of excess reserves. And the central bank may not want to wait until 2020 (see post) for the reserves to decline to more normal levels on their own. Here are some reasons:

1. Some economists feel that even though reserves do not immediately transmit into lending, bank loans and leases have been rising steadily since early 2011 (QE2), and over the years could, if left unchecked, raise the money supply to inflationary levels.

Loans and leases on US banks' balance sheets (source: NY Fed)

2. Bloated excess reserves may ultimately impact the value of the dollar.

3. There are concerns that over a longer period, excess reserves could distort certain markets, creating financial bubbles - as banks seek to deploy cheap capital (in real estate for example).

4. With the reserves at their expected peak the Fed would be paying out about $6bn per year in interest to banks on riskless deposits. And those of us who have checking and savings accounts know that the rate we get on deposits is close to zero. Corporate accounts are not much better. That means that the banking system will get to keep most of that money. Now if the Fed raises the rate it pays on reserves (as suggested above), the banks will generate multiples of that amount in riskless profits. Once again, in a normal environment that would not be a big deal, but these days the Fed doling out free money to banks is not going to be very popular with the public.

These are some of the reasons the Fed may choose to drain at least some of the reserves. Selling assets may be one way to do it, but that may shake up the markets and significantly raise long-term interest rates. It will also generate realized losses for the Fed – another potentially unpopular outcome. But there is another solution. Back in 2009 the Fed set up tri-party repo arrangements with a number of dealers (see 2009 post). Eventually that will allow the central bank to lend out the securities instead of selling them. As dealers borrow the securities over a period of a week for example, they post cash as collateral to the Fed (dealers pay the coupon on the securities they borrow and receive the market repo rate on their cash “collateral”). That cash going into the repo account is taken out of “circulation”, thus draining the reserves.

If the Fed rolls these repo positions over time, the reserves will stay “drained” but the securities will still be owned by the Fed - until they pay down or mature. In effect the Fed would sterilize some or all of its securities purchases. Which means that draining the reserves does not have to entail the painful process of active portfolio unwind. And draining excess reserves is in fact a more likely exit strategy than some economists have been expecting.



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Monday, February 25, 2013

Europe back in focus as Italy braces for a deadlocked parliament

All of a sudden Europe matters. As discussed last week (see post), Italy's election was creating risks of a "weak and fragmented coalition" that could slow down or even reverse the pace of much needed reforms. And now we are indeed looking at a deadlocked parliament, with little ability to form a coalition in the upper house.
Reuters: - A huge protest vote by Italians enraged by economic hardship and political corruption pushed the country towards deadlock after an election on Monday, with voting projections showing no coalition strong enough to form a government.

With more than two thirds of the vote counted, the projections suggested the center left could have a slim lead in the race for the lower house of parliament.

But no party or likely coalition appeared likely to be able to form a majority in the upper house or Senate, creating a deadlocked parliament - the opposite of the stable result that Italy desperately needs to tackle a deep recession, rising unemployment and a massive public debt.

Such an outcome has the potential to revive fears over the euro zone debt crisis, with prospects of a long period of uncertainty in the zone's third largest economy.
Of course people were quite surprised about the comeback of Berlusconi (discussed here back in December). It takes a crook to promise to pay the electorate for voting him in, but that's exactly what Berlusconi did. He tapped into the "electoral rebellion", and although he did not win, he certainly injected himself into whatever coalition that may end up being formed.
WSJ: - Surprising, too, was the comeback of Mr. Berlusconi, whose party was in the doldrums as late as November of last year. The 76-year-old billionaire politician's late surge is attributed largely to the media blitz in recent weeks.

"Whoever thought Berlusconi was finished will have to think again," said Angelino Alfano, head of the conservative People of Freedom party.
...
"The cost of austerity led to an electoral rebellion," said Enrico Letta, deputy head of the Democratic Party. "This is a complex situation to live and manage."
Italian government bond spreads widened in response and the euro sold off.



The market reaction was particularly strong in equities where Italian stocks took a real beating. The chart below shows market action over the past five days for EWI (USD-based Italian market ETF - blue) vs. SPY (S&P500 ETF - red).

Click to enlarge

Given that much of today's selloff took place after the European close, the markets' open in Europe tomorrow morning is expected to be ugly.



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Leveraged loan market on fire

Sub-investment-grade loans continue to perform well, driven by demand for floating rate product. As an example, the chart below compares the performance of Invesco's "Senior Income" fund (VVR) - which mostly holds loans of non-investment-grade companies - with HYG (iShares junk bond ETF) and an S&P500 ETF.

Source: Ycharts (click to enlarge)

Capital continues to flow into this asset class at record levels.
JPMorgan: - Leveraged loan funds had another record inflow, totaling +$1.42bn for the week (2.90% of AUM), following previous record-high inflow totaling +$1.20bn the prior week (2.52% of AUM). This marked the 35th consecutive inflow for loan funds, and the breakdown of this week’s flows was a +$179mn inflow into the ETF (13%) and an inflow totaling $1.24bn into actively managed funds (87%). For context, there have only been two other $1bn+ weekly inflows reported for loans, with those being December 22nd 2010 and February 9th 2011. Overall, the past four weeks’ inflows are the largest for the asset class since 1Q11, a period when interest rate pressure was elevated in the wake of QE2 and growth expectations were robust.
Indeed the demand for senior corporate loans of leveraged firms (otherwise known as "bank loans" because each is structured as a loan provided by a bank) is enticing companies to hit the market while the going is good. Loan issuance hit a new high recently.

Source: JPMorgan

The demand is not only coming from registered funds, but also from hedge funds as well as CLOs, (companies that securitize these loan portfolios). CLO volume clocked at $52 billion last year, while market participants expected only about $15 billion for 2012. The expectation for 2013 CLO issuance is $65bn according to JPMorgan, and all that collateral will have to come from somewhere.

As market participants rotate out of HY bonds, which have been frothy for some time (see post), and into loans, we are seeing the beginnings of another QE-driven market frenzy. Covenant-light transactions are a large part of the primary market recently,
JPMorgan: - ... the number of covenant-lite deals priced in the leveraged loan market also remained heavy. Specifically, covenant-lite loans accounted for 41% of issuance this week ($10.5bn), which followed $18.9bn (53%) last week, $14.7bn (47%) in January, and $58bn (51%) in 4Q12.
... and deal leverage is increasing as well, with an average LBO at 5.5 times (according to S&P). This is still below the 6.2 record level reached in 2007, but in terms of the overall leverage we are roughly where deals priced during the 2005- 2006 period.

When the Fed looks for signs of liquidity-driven market pricing, the central bank won't need to look too far. The question is, are they looking at all?

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Sunday, February 24, 2013

The Fed to face challenges as it ultimately exits the unprecedented monetary expansion

The recently released minutes of the last FOMC meeting made some economists and market participants begin contemplating the Fed's exit, its timing, and the implications. This is because the FOMC's discussion sounded a bit more hawkish than many had anticipated.
FOMC Minutes: - ... many participants also expressed some concerns about potential costs and risks arising from further asset purchases. Several participants discussed the possible complications that additional purchases could cause for the eventual withdrawal of policy accommodation, a few mentioned the prospect of inflationary risks, and some noted that further asset purchases could foster market behavior that could undermine financial stability.
But what will an exit from such extraordinary expansionary policy actually look like? Much of course will depend on the trajectory of the US economy in the next couple of years, but there are two key possibilities. One is that the Fed will simply end purchases and let the securities naturally pay down (due to prepayments on MBS) and mature. However, given the rate at which excess reserves are now being created through asset purchases, it may take too long to "drain" these balances (excess reserves represent the largest component of the monetary base now).



According to DB, without any securities sales it will take until 2020 before bank reserves return to normal - after the latest round of purchases as well as purchases yet to come. If inflationary pressures pick up, the pace of a "passive" exit may end up being insufficient.

The alternative would be to begin selling securities in order to accelerate the draining of the reserves. The chart below compares the two potential scenarios.

The liability side of Fed's balance sheet (source: Deutsche Bank)

But there is a cost to this "active" exit strategy. Long before the Fed officially telegraphs that it will begin selling, the markets will push long-term rates higher. MBS durations will extend as prepayments slow, and MBS spreads will likely widen. The market will begin effectively "front-running" the Fed. Moreover, MBS holders and mortgage servicers will begin to actively hedge their portfolios (something many are not doing now due to high prepayment activity) by shorting long-dated treasuries and steepening the yield curve more.

By the time the Fed actually begins selling, its massive securities holdings will likely be "under water" and many sales will result in realized losses (note that the Fed generally isn't concerned about unrealized losses that would be generated during a "passive" exit).

In recent years the net interest income generated by the Fed (less operating expenses) hit a record due to all the coupon payments in the Fed's portfolio. This income has been remitted to the US treasury on an annual basis. But as losses from sales accumulate, the "dividend" which the Fed has been paying in the past, will dwindle and possibly turn into a loss. The amount of loss will depend on interest rates as well as on the timing of the exit. According to DB, if sales begin this summer - an unlikely scenario - the net losses could largely be avoided.

Fed's net income under 3 scenarios (source: Deutsche Bank)

The blue line above dips further down of course if long-term rates move higher than projected. Some FOMC members are in fact becoming concerned about this outcome.
FOMC Minutes: - Several participants noted that a very large portfolio of long-duration assets would, under certain circumstances, expose the Federal Reserve to significant capital losses when these holdings were unwound...
Furthermore, if the Fed raises the overnight (Fed Funds) rate, it will also have to increase the rate it pays on excess reserves (the two will likely be adjusted in tandem), increasing the cost of liabilities and exacerbating losses. The "active" exit strategy therefore looks quite messy.

In practice however the Fed should be able to absorb such a loss. It would in effect "borrow" from itself to cover the loss until it generates enough income to extinguish this P&L item. This is "accounting magic" that only a central bank can implement.
DB: - Possibly in anticipation of [losses], the Fed adopted new accounting principles in January 2011, which specify that realizations of negative net income are capitalized as an asset on their balance sheet. This “asset” would be counterbalanced by the creation of additional reserves of value equal to the asset. That is, the Fed would in essence create new money to cover its losses. The increase in reserves created to deal with the Fed’s income losses will only partly offset the reduction in excess reserves associated with the asset sales that generated the losses in the first place.... Over time, the deferred asset would accumulate if the Fed continued to experience negative net income and be reduced when net income turned positive. Once the deferred asset was reduced to zero again, the Fed would resume remittance of its positive net income to the Treasury.
Other than the loss of revenue for the US Treasury, the problem for the Fed will be mostly reputational, as it carries these losses on its balance sheet - potentially for years. But given the public's perception of the Fed these days, such a loss is something the FOMC will likely take quite seriously.


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Is the US facing a housing shortage?

Homes available for sale as well as the housing supplies measured in months are now at pre-recession levels, while household formation continues to recover (see post). This development was predicted by William Wheaton back in 2009.

Source: JPMorgan

Forbes: - Most striking however is the fact that inventory has contracted to its lowest level since December 1999, more than 13 years ago. The number of available homes, which is not seasonally adjusted, fell 4.9% from December and is 25.3% lower than a year ago. With 1.74 million homes on the market, at the current sales pace, supply will be exhausted in just over four months. It represents the lowest housing supply since April 2005. In a normal market, a healthy supply level is about six months.
A number of economists continue to talk about the shadow inventory - the millions of homes that are "about to hit the market" as homeowners have or shortly will fail on their mortgages. Some evidence suggests that in the more depressed housing areas banks are indeed sitting on foreclosed properties, unwilling to sell. But a number of banks have also been aggressively modifying mortgages, reducing principal and interest, and therefore cutting delinquencies.

Clearly many more homes will be hitting the markets this year. But it really doesn't make much difference if people who move out of these homes end up buying or renting - they need to live somewhere. And according to the Census Bureau, rental vacancies are near a 10-year low.

Ironically, the relatively tight credit conditions are (at least partially) restricting new home construction. Completion of new housing units has improved recently but remains at historically depressed levels - certainly not enough to keep up with the population growth and family formation. The danger of course is that with spring approaching (generally a period of increased demand for homes), some markets could overheat due to tight supplies, worsening home affordability and dampening sales numbers.




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Thursday, February 21, 2013

Italy's recession and upcoming elections threaten reforms

The Guardian had a good summary yesterday on the situation in Italy, where the recession is showing no signs of abating. The winner of the upcoming elections will face some severe challenges.
The Guardian: - A stagnating economy, corruption, organised crime, political apathy, misogyny, youth unemployment ... The person elected to run Italy next weekend will have a formidable to-do list.

The country is now in its longest recession in 20 years, the economy having contracted for the last six consecutive quarters and languished in more than a decade of almost non-existent growth. Unemployment is at more than 11%; for under-25s, it is more than 36%. Italy has the second highest ratio of sovereign debt to GDP in the EU.

It could have been worse. In autumn 2011, when Mario Monti took over after years of successive governments largely ignoring the problem, there were fears that the EU's fourth largest economy might fall into the abyss and drag the rest of the eurozone with it. The technocrat government avoided that disaster scenario and has done much to restore the markets' faith in Italy. Late last year, before the spectre of a Silvio Berlusconi comeback unsettled matters, 10-year bond yields were at a two-year low. It has implemented reforms – including of the pension system and labour market – that are viewed as a crucial part of long-term recovery and could, according to the IMF, lead to a 6% increase in GDP if properly implemented.

But economists say much more needs to be done to effect the kind of deep and lasting change needed to get Italy growing again. They focus on Italy's lack of competitiveness; its untapped labour market resources – women and young people; a thorough reform of product markets and of crucial institutions such as the justice and education systems. Only once these have been properly tackled, they say, will Italy be in a position to capitalise on its strengths, which include a strong manufacturing base, successful exporters, relatively low budget deficit and relatively high domestic savings. The big fear, however, is that the election will not usher in a strong, responsible government, but yet more political instability, which Italy can ill afford.
It is particularly troubling to see the industrial sector of the economy still contracting, even as Germany's industries stabilize.

Source: Deutsche Bank

As discussed earlier (see post), Berlusconi is now using the nation's economic mess to his advantage, increasing the risk to recent reforms implemented by Monti.
Reuters: - Confidence in Italy has been shaken in the run-up to the voting, after a strong campaign by former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi that has opened up the three-way race with outgoing premier Mario Monti and centre-left leader Pier Luigi Bersani.

"Investors are becoming more and more cautious ahead of the weekend ... and altogether people decided here to pull the trigger and go risk-off," said Christian Lenk, a fixed income strategist at DZ Bank.
According to S&P, Italy could repeat its history of forming "weak and fragmented coalition governments", dampening or even reversing the much needed reforms.
S&P: - We believe that a risk exists that after the Feb 24-25 elections there may be a loss of momentum on important reforms to improve Italian growth prospects ...

The implementation of measures to boost Italy's medium-term growth prospects depends, in our view, on the strength of the next government's mandate in both houses of parliament.

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