Tuesday, July 21, 2009

Hedge funds raising new capital

With improved performance and continued strong outperfomance against the equity markets (see Buffett's bet gone wrong) hedge funds are able to raise money again.

From Hedge Fund Research:
Assets invested in the hedge fund industry increased by $100 billion in the second quarter of 2009, ending at $1.43 trillion...

The Fund of Funds sector however continues to struggle. Looks like in the post-Madoff world institutions want to do more of their own allocations, figuring they can rely on their own due diligence or on consultants (like Aksia), rather than paying a fund of funds. From Bloomberg:
Investors took $33 billion from funds that invest in other hedge funds in the second quarter. Assets in those pools fell to $530 billion from a peak of $825 billion in middle of 2008.




CIT CDS still at distressed levels

Following up on the post called CIT Lifeline Here is a quote from Reuters:
The lender said it could file for bankruptcy if the offer does not succeed. The offer, disclosed on Monday, is $825 for each $1,000 principal amount of notes tendered on or before July 31.

As the shares dip below $1 again the market is saying the risk in CIT is still tremendous. Let's take a look at CDS levels (which are significantly off the highs):

CIT 5-yr CDS spread



This chart shows the CIT CDS term structure. The curve is inverted as it generally is for distressed names. This basically says that the longer CIT survives the more chances are it will be able to stabilize it's business. Again, the levels are off from the highs, but it still trades inverted - very much like a distressed name.



Monday, July 20, 2009

Asia, the next big bubble

In a recent post called Pegged renminbi will be hard to internationalize, we discussed the issue China faces as it tries to maintain it's export based economy. It does so by holding the currency artificially low to make their product look cheaper to the world. To accomplish this, they must continuously purchase dollars, while selling renminbi. But where do they get the renminbi to sell?

Well in what's called an "unsterilized" FX transaction, China simply "prints" the new renminbi to sell (as opposed to a "sterilized" transaction where the central bank sells currency spot but agrees to buy it forward, thus not impacting the money supply.) The newly "minted" renminbi sold by the central bank for dollars simply gets deposited in it's banking system, increasing the money supply. This is how they keep the currency from shooting up 30%. It's a dangerous game, because all that new renminbi deposited in Chana's banks has to go somewhere.

With the money supply growing rapidly, China could raise interest rates to control inflation. But if they do so while the USD rates are nearly zero, it will put even more upward pressure on their currency. If you have an asset at par with the dollar that pays higher rates and can only go up in value, you'd be buying as much as you can. So as long as Western rates remain low, China has to keep their interest rates relatively low.

Banks in China are lending and will continue to lend at least some of those excess deposits. Thus unlike in the US, where banks are in the process of repairing their balance sheets, China has what's called a multiplier effect going.

According to recent research from HSBC, this phenomena of artificially low currency values and local banks that are able to lend is prevalent across the exporter nations of Asia. This stimulus will create a tremendous asset bubble across the region (particularly in equity prices and real estate.)

If people fear that all the stimulus in the US will create inflation, think about countries with a real multiplier effect. Given that the US, and Europe will keep their rates low for a while, by the time the stimulus in Asia is taken away, the bubble momentum will be unstoppable.

From HSBC: Asian policy rates - have to stay low as long as Western rates stay low




From HSBC:

The remarkable thing about such liquidity-driven asset bubbles is their long-cycles, underlining the eventual potency of loose monetary policy. Also, successive monetary tightening over the course of the bubble has apparently little impact: once the financial accelerator goes into full throttle, it takes aggressive tightening to pop the bubble – and, more often than not, policy-makers are reluctant to step up for fear of bringing down the house.

Credit continues to grow in Asia with no major slowdown due to the crisis.

From HSBC: Credit growth across Asia


At the same time deposit rates are growing as well, driven in part by the "unsterelized" currency interventions that force dollar sellers to deposit the currency proceeds in that country's banks.

Deposit growth y-o-y



Deposit growth and credit expansion accelerate the monetary base growth.

Base money growth y-oy:



All this translates into loose monetary conditions in Asia that lead to an asset bubble:

The Monetary Conditions Index; y-o-y



Expect corporate leverage, property, and equity price levels to balloon to dangerous levels as liquidity continues to grow unabated throughout Asia. This is the next big bubble.





Secondary hedge funds discount holding

Secondary hedge fund transactions continue to be done at a discount. The levels are way above the lows of the crisis and have stabilized around 90 cents on the dollar.

In the past many of the "hot" funds were closed to new investors, so to get in, one had to pay a full price (NAV) or even higher (premium). Now the world has changed and most funds are open to new investors (unless they are liquidating). So why would someone pay par to get in via a secondary trade when one could come into the fund directly? The discount is here to stay.





CIT lifeline

CIT is about to get a $3 billion lifeline from it's bondholders in the form of secured debt. This hurts the current secured debt holders as they get diluted, but gives the unsecured debt holders some negotiating leverage.

CIT's business model is still broken, because unlike a bank they had heavily relied on the commercial paper market. That market is no longer there for them. To finance themselves with a deposit base (like a bank), CIT would need to build a branch network, but there is no time or the funds to do so.

To survive, CIT would need to roll it's unsecured debt, most likely below par. That is they would need to convert a dollar of unsecured debt into say 80c of secured. Current bondholders may accept this level of pain, given they already mark the debt way below par. That type of transaction might be doable with the $32 billion of unencumbered assets they currently hold. These assets would be used as collateral for the exchange (as well as for the $3 billion loan announced today).

CIT will also probably continue transferring more of the eligible (better quality) assets to their bank, in order to get more financing via wholesale term deposits (certificates of deposit) that would be FDIC guaranteed and much cheaper.

Saturday, July 18, 2009

Of Goldman, bubbles, and hype

If you haven't already read this widely distributed story on Goldman, it's worth a read, particularly on a Sunday night.

It's called The Great American Bubble Machine, by Matt Taibbi, first published by the Rolling Stone.


Illustration by Victor Juhasz (RS)

Reading the article will make you mad. But before you go out to lynch Goldman employees (as many Sober Look readers have suggested), think about the wise old statement "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone..." (John 8:7). Our discussion here is not about defending Goldman or it's practices. It's about a much broader shared blame that goes way beyond the aggressive and profitable firm called Goldman Sachs.

On a personal note and for the purposes of disclosure, I have never worked for Goldman nor do I own GS shares. But some years back a recruiter called to tell me he wanted me to interview for a job at that firm. I told him thanks, but no thanks. He said "are you crazy? People would kill their grandmother to work there". My answer was "that's exactly why I DON'T want to work there."

I have however dealt with Goldman as a client (or a potential client) on numerous occasions. Goldman employees exude professionalism and creativity. They always have the latest twist on an existing product or a unique solution to a problem. In general they will be more expensive than others - they don't want to win on price. They also don't want to win on providing balance sheet (if they provide credit, they will unload the risk somewhere else). They generally want to win on innovation. If you've done a transaction with them, more likely than not they've made good money. And unless you have the sophistication to match theirs, you won't know how they made money on you.


Per Taibbi's story (as well as thousands of other conspiracy theories), Goldman alums are everywhere. They are particularly prevalent in government posts - from Corzine to Paulson. But think about these types of jobs. It takes a polished, smart, yet a ruthless and driven workaholic to have these government posts or to run for a major political office. It also takes much money and connections. Well, ex-Goldman guys have the perfect combination of these traits. That's why they are in these roles. Not because somehow the US government is controlled by Goldman (sorry to disappoint many of you).

This by the way is no different than the Skull and Bones society at Yale. Workaholic qualities, intelligence (sometimes), polished presentation, money, connections (in this case it's family connections vs. Goldman alums network) gives one a real advantage in politics.

With this backdrop, let's take a look at how Goldman "caused" or is about to cause all the financial bubbles, one at a time.
BUBBLE #1 The Great Depression

...Goldman ... sponsored a new trust, the Shenandoah Corporation, issuing millions more in shares in that fund — which in turn sponsored yet another trust called the Blue Ridge Corporation. In this way, each investment trust served as a front for an endless investment pyramid: Goldman hiding behind Goldman hiding behind Goldman. Of the 7,250,000 initial shares of Blue Ridge, 6,250,000 were actually owned by Shenandoah — which, of course, was in large part owned by Goldman Trading.

The product he is discussing here is basically a mutual fund on steroids - a stock portfolio with leverage. These actually exist today in another form: many ETFs have leverage. Goldman was by no means the first to set one of these up. The Foreign & Colonial Government Trust, the first investment trust, was set up in the UK in in 1868 and is still open to investors today (known as The Foreign & Colonial Investment Trust).

Share Investment Trust, launched in 1872, was the first to use leverage (also in the UK). By the time Goldman's Shenandoah came along, funds with leverage and ponzi schemes were everywhere. Goldman just did it in size, marketed these aggressively, and used tons of leverage. This ultimately nearly destroyed the firm.

In terms of the asset bubble, JPMorgan was probably more to blame than Goldman, as John Pierpont Morgan had been providing support for the stock market for years prior to the crash (similar to the Fed in the last 20 years), creating the ultimate in "moral hazard". William Durant and the Rockefeller family did their part as well. But the "get rich fast" mentality permeating the nation was the key driver for the bubble.

BUBBLE #2 Tech Stocks

... The basic scam in the Internet Age is pretty easy even for the financially illiterate to grasp. Companies that weren't much more than potfueled ideas scrawled on napkins by uptoolate bongsmokers were taken public via IPOs, hyped in the media and sold to the public for mega-millions. It was as if banks like Goldman were wrapping ribbons around watermelons, tossing them out 50-story windows and opening the phones for bids. In this game you were a winner only if you took your money out before the melon hit the pavement.

All true. Goldman was on the forefront of the tech IPO mania. But let's get some perspective here. Does anyone remember CSFB's role? Maybe not. How about Frank Quattrone? Ring any bells? Well it was actually not Goldman who was the top IPO banker, but CSFB's Quattrone (he took public Netscape, Cisco, and Amazon.com), earning $160 million a year. All investment banks who could get into the IPO game got in - large and small. Somehow Taibbi doesn't want to discuss this, as it may dilute his story.

Let's bring in a quick example from history: the great California Gold Rush. Many gave up their land and occupations to go to California. However, remember that very few miners actually made money. Instead it was all the service providers who got rich - in fact that's how San Francisco was built. Taibbi would probably argue that bubble was Goldman's fault as well.

In the 90s so much was made on a few successful IPOs that it became the new gold rush. Remember FNN getting into the game and spreading the IPO gospel, helping the mania? Remember the stay-home moms watching FNN all day and trading stocks? Remember 19-year-old kids taking out student loans to buy Yahoo! shares like it was a drug? How about people quitting their jobs and college in droves to start tech companies, hoping to become the next Bill Gates?

Goldman as well as CSFB and numerous others were riding the wave, ready to accommodate. It's absolutely true, these firms had deployed unethical and sometimes illegal practices, but just as the service providers in the Gold Rush, they didn't cause the bubble.

BUBBLE #3 The Housing Craze

... Take one $494 million issue that year, GSAMP Trust 2006S3. Many of the mortgages belonged to secondmortgage borrowers, and the average equity they had in their homes was 0.71 percent. Moreover, 58 percent of the loans included little or no documentation — no names of the borrowers, no addresses of the homes, just zip codes. Yet both of the major ratings agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor's, rated 93 percent of the issue as investment grade. Moody's projected that less than 10 percent of the loans would default. In reality, 18 percent of the mortgages were in default within 18 months.


This is true. However Goldman was not the largest player in this market. This was in part because Goldman never liked committing balance sheet. Citi on the other hand was more than willing to commit balance sheet (via CP conduits), pushing sub-prime ABS product out the door in billions. Bear Stearns used it's internal hedge funds to buy (on leverage) sub-prime paper they (as well as others) structured. Lehman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill were all big players as well, and the list goes on. And just to help some remember, it was UBS that was the buyer of same of that paper (folks in Zurich felt that if it's real estate, it's got to be good) and always wanted more (in fact their internal hedge fund Dillon Read did the same thing that Bear Stearns was doing). Citi was right there to sell them more. Wachovia (remember that bank?) was a large scale buyer and structurer of sub-prime ABS as well.

Taibbi argues that Goldman shorted the paper it sold. At least Goldman publicly said they are negative on the asset class. Morgan Stanley was shorting sub-prime (though not enough to avoid huge losses). The firm known to short sub-prime on a large scale and tell clients about it was actually Deutsche Bank. Good for them.

And what was the Fed doing? Pumping more liquidity into the system to get the bubble nice and big. Sorry Mr. Taibbi, it wasn't Goldman that caused the housing bubble either. Everybody had a hand in it - from mortgage brokers, to house speculators, regional banks, investment banks, monolines, the rating agencies, the BIS and the Fed.

BUBBLE #4 $4 a Gallon

... With the public reluctant to put money in anything that felt like a paper investment, the Street quietly moved the casino to the physical-commodities market — stuff you could touch: corn, coffee, cocoa, wheat and, above all, energy commodities, especially oil. In conjunction with a decline in the dollar, the credit crunch and the housing crash caused a "flight to commodities." Oil futures in particular skyrocketed, as the price of a single barrel went from around $60 in the middle of 2007 to a high of $147 in the summer of 2008.

Put yourself into the environment of the early 2008. The supply/demand chart for oil looked ugly. As China/India demand was forecast to grow, the supply was predicted to shrink. The dollar was collapsing. Geopolitical situation looked terrible: from belligerent Iran and Venezuela, to newly aggressive Russia, to unstable Nigeria. Rice hoarding and shortages were popping up all over the globe. Think about it - Goldman or not - as a pension or an endowment, what would would you be investing in? Yes, Goldman economists were bullish oil to the last minute, but so was the rest of the world.

BUBBLE #5 Rigging the Bailout

... Once the bailouts were in place, Goldman went right back to business as usual, dreaming up impossibly convoluted schemes to pick the American carcass clean of its loose capital. One of its first moves in the postbailout era was to quietly push forward the calendar it uses to report its earnings, essentially wiping December 2008 — with its $1.3 billion in pretax losses — off the books. At the same time, the bank announced a highly suspicious $1.8 billion profit for the first quarter of 2009 — which apparently included a large chunk of money funneled to it by taxpayers via the AIG bailout. "They cooked those firstquarter results six ways from Sunday," says one hedgefund manager. "They hid the losses in the orphan month and called the bailout money profit.


That's right, Goldman did that. It made their 09 performance look better than it was. Must be that PwC is in on this as well - they are the auditor. Unlike Citi, UBS, Merrill, Wachovia, etc. however, Goldman did not rely on TARP to survive - they raised equity from Buffett. With regard to AIG, Goldman actually bought protection on AIG, fully prepared for it to go under. But all that aside, the bailout wasn't a "bubble", so Taibbi's bubble theme doesn't apply here.

BUBBLE #6 Global Warming

... Here's how it works: If the bill passes, there will be limits for coal plants, utilities, natural-gas distributors and numerous other industries on the amount of carbon emissions (a.k.a. greenhouse gases) they can produce per year. If the companies go over their allotment, they will be able to buy "allocations" or credits from other companies that have managed to produce fewer emissions. President Obama conservatively estimates that about $646 billion worth of carbon credits will be auctioned in the first seven years; one of his top economic aides speculates that the real number might be twice or even three times that amount.


This one is completely absurd. Goldman knows that carbon credit trading in the US is happening sooner or later. It's been in place in Europe for years. Any good business, when presented with a huge new market will invest to get ready for it.

With regard to the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), nobody will benefit more from carbon trading than it's founder, Richard Sandor. Sandor (not Goldman) is the inventor of carbon trading (he's worked on it for 20 years or so.) He owns the bulk of CCX, and he is the one who got Goldman to take a share in order to create liquidity in the fledgling market.

Carbon trading is in fact an implicit tax. This is probably not the right time to implement it, given the fragile economy. It's also unfair to push it on the US, while China continues to pump massive amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. But if one had a choice between "carbon cap" and "cap & trade", the latter is always preferable. Cap and trade will stimulate clean air technologies and create carbon offsets (such as farmers planting trees). The reason it will work is that people stand to make money doing it (from farmers, to biofuels manufacturers, to utilities). And investors/traders (including Goldman) stand to make money as well.

Just as many other large US corporations, from GE (dumping PCBs into the Hudson river) to Exxon (a little spill in Alaska), Goldman is guilty of a number of unethical and illegal practices over the years. But to say that Goldman caused the various bubbles throughout history is a bit of a stretch, wouldn't you agree Mr. Taibbi?

Friday, July 17, 2009

The $1.2 trillion healthcare reform bill derailed

From the Washington Post:
Under questioning by members of the Senate Budget Committee, Douglas Elmendorf, director of the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, said bills crafted by House leaders and the Senate health committee do not propose "the sort of fundamental changes" necessary to rein in the skyrocketing cost of government health programs, particularly Medicare. On the contrary, Elmendorf said, the measures would pile on an expensive new program to cover the uninsured.


Not only are we looking at an escalating budget deficit, but this bill would have a negative impact on job growth. Forcing corporations to pay the "health care tax" will incentivize them to reduce hiring (the CNBC interview below clearly points that out). Tax increases on individuals will reduce growth (as we've shown in Tax shock to the economy will create a W-shaped "recovery"). Half of the people hit by this new tax will be small businesses.

The nation is having second thoughts about this proposed health care reform bill. Congress is sensing the changing mood and reacting accordingly.





Beleaguered venture capital industry strikes back

On July 15th Trevor Loy, who runs a $40 mm venture capital fund called Flywheel Ventures, testified before the Senate Banking Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance and Investment Hearing. The testimony was in reference to the proposed SEC Registration Requirements we discussed in the previous post.

The testimony is embedded below, but here is the key quote:
By requiring venture funds to register with the SEC under the Advisers Act, the administrative burden on the firm and the CFO would grow exponentially. In addition to filing information regarding the identification of the firm, its partners and assets under management, the Advisers Act establishes a number of substantive requirements that would change the operation of a venture fund and the relationship between the venture fund and its limited partners. Many of these requirements, which are summarized below, would demand significant resources and overhead which sophisticated investors have not requested and venture funds currently do not have in place.

This proposed legislation could not have come at a worst time for the venture capital industry. From the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA):
Just 25 venture capital funds raised $1.7 billion in the second quarter of 2009, according to Thomson Reuters and the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). This level represents the smallest number of venture funds raising money in a single quarter since the third quarter of 1996 (21 funds) and the lowest level of dollars committed since the first quarter of 2003 when $938.1 million was raised.
The chart below shows the fund raising trend in the last 9 quarters.



This blunt force registration requirement may be the last straw for a number of managers who just may close shop. The last thing that the US economy needs right now is reduced capital flow for start-ups and innovation. The administration and Congress should keep in mind that Google, eBay, and Amazon all started with venture backing.



Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...
Bookmark this post:
Share on StockTwits
Scoop.it